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These included all the so-called 'commonwealthman' writers of seventeenthand eighteenth-century England and America, as Pocock had shown.
While following the spirit and direction of Skinner's analysis, I argued for a variation on his construal in my book, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. 6 The republican conception of freedom was certainly negative, I maintained, but it did not represent liberty as noninterference in the manner that Hobbes inaugurated and that came to prominence among nineteenth-century liberal writers. It was, rather, a conception of liberty in which the antonym is not interference as such but rather dominatio or domination. Domination is subjection to an arbitrary power of interference on the part of another-a dominus or master-even another who chooses not actually to exercise that power. Republican freedom, I maintained, should be defined as nondomination, not noninterference. thinks that what unites them in particular is the conception of liberty that they derived from Roman and Renaissance sources and not, for example, an opposition to monarchy as such. 0 This conception of liberty they apply in the first place to states, he maintains, and in the second to the individual; their characteristic assumption-well grounded, I believe '-is that 'it is only possible to be free in a free state '.12 In this book, Skinner reinforces the theme of his earlier research, that these thinkers did not think of freedom as being tied definitionally to participation in a self-determining polity. While stressing that such neo-Romans thought it was essential for people to have sufficient civic virtue to be willing to participate in political life-only thus would their freedom be assured-he denies that they identified individual freedom with virtue or the right of political participation. 'The writers I am discussing merely argue that participation (at least by way of representation) constitutes a necessary precondition of maintaining individual liberty'.'3 The idea is that since one is free only in a free Pettit / KEEPING REPUBLICAN FREEDOM SIMPLE 341 state, one cannot hope to be free-free-rider issues, presumably, apartunless one plays a participatory part in the local polity.
But Skinner goes beyond this earlier argument about liberty and here maintains, with generous reference to the claims in my own work, that the Roman and neo-Roman school of thought did have a different conception of liberty from the negative one that became popular after Bentham.'4 Where before he had attributed to those writers the negative conception of liberty as noncoercion or noninterference, he now maintains that they had a distinctive conception of their own. As they reject the positive identification of individual freedom with virtue or the right to participate in government, so he says that they reject the negative identification of freedom with the absence of coercion. They oppose 'the key assumption of classical liberalism to the effect that force or the coercive threat of it constitute the only forms of constraint that interfere with individual liberty'.15
Skinner argues that where liberals after Bentham came to care only about coercion of the body or the will, republicans had cared about dependency on the good will of another, even dependency in the case where there is no actual coercion.16 As he says in elaborating the extra neo-Roman concern, 'It is never necessary to suffer this kind of overt coercion in order to forfeit your civil liberty. You will also be rendered unfree if you merely fall into a condition of political subjection or dependence'."7 Thus it is vital, he explains, to ensure that your government not give any individual or group prerogative or discretionary powers. is not forced to track the avowed or readily avowable interests of the other:
they can interfere according to their own arbitrium or decision.
Despite our agreeing on the meaning of dependency or domination, however, and despite our both thinking that republican writers saw it as inimical to freedom, there is a remaining difference between our accounts of the neoRoman or republican conception of freedom. Roughly stated, I hold that for republicans freedom means nondomination, period, whereas he says that it means nondomination and noninterference.19 On his view, Romans and neoRomans shared the concern of classical liberals for the reduction of coercion of the body and will, even the sort of coercion-as they saw it, the nondominating coercion-associated with a fair rule of law. They were concerned to reduce domination or dependency, including the sort that involves no interference, but they were equally concerned to reduce interference, even the sort that involves no domination.20 On my view their primary concern was with reducing domination.
TO PRIORITISE DOMINATION OR TO EQUATE DOMINATION AND INTERFERENCE?
The issue between Skinner and me is whether in giving an account of republican liberty, we should prioritise domination as the antonym of freedom or equate domination and interference as part of a joint antonym. I now look in greater detail at this issue, arguing that while the divergence between us is significant, and certainly worth marking, it is not as deep as it may at first seem.
The crucial point to note is this. Even if domination is the only antonym of freedom, it is still going to follow according to my analysis that undominating or nonarbitrary interference-in particular, the interference suffered in living under a coercive but fair rule of law-must count as a secondary offence against freedom. Such a rule of law will not compromise freedom, in the manner of a dominating agency, but it will condition freedom, as I put it in my book;21 it will reduce the range or ease with which people enjoy undominated choice.
The distinction between compromising and conditioning factors is famil- proper or formal, whether that be noninterference or nondomination. And second, the ideal that consists in also having the other resources required to enjoy the noninterference or the nondomination: the ideal that some writers call effective or real freedom as distinct from merely formal freedom.22
Thus, the formal ideal of noninterference will be made effective through the reduction of nonintentional obstacles to the enjoyment of uninterferedwith choice: obstacles such as poverty, ill health, handicap or lack of talent, or obstacles that are unintended effects of what others do; not being intentional, none of these restrictions count themselves as forms of interference. The formal ideal of nondomination will be made effective through the reduction both of nonintentional obstacles and also intentional but nonarbitrary obstaclesfor example, obstacles raised by a nonarbitrary rule of law-to the enjoyment of undominated choice. Where the evil that must be absent for formal freedom-interference or domination-can be said to compromise such freedom, I describe these obstacles that limit the enjoyment of formal freedom as conditioning that freedom without compromising it.
According to Skinner's account, republican freedom requires both noninterference and nondomination. According to mine, formal republican freedom requires only the absence of domination, but effective republican freedom also requires the minimisation of intentional interference, as of course-presumably like Skinner's own account-it will require the minimisation of nonintentional obstacles like those associated with poverty, handicap, and the like. Thus, the difference between the two accounts does not go very deep. He presents the ideal of republican freedom as horizontally complex, so far as it involves two coordinated and distinct elements: nondomination and noninterference.23 I present the ideal as vertically complex, so far as it involves those same two elements, but with one subordinated to the other. Freedom will be formally present so far as domination is avoided, and it will be effectively present so far as intentional interferenceand nonintentional obstruction-is absent.
The best way to relate these two accounts is to consider the following four scenarios and ask how they will be ranked under the accounts:
1. Neither interference nor domination 2. Both interference and domination 3. Domination without interference
Interference without domination
The first two scenarios will be ranked in the same way under the two accounts of the republican ideal, scoring respectively top and bottom in an overall ranking. Moreover, the two accounts will both be able to distinguish What of the last two scenarios? Under both of our accounts these are less good than the first scenario and better than the second. But the accounts differ in how they rank them relative to one another. Under my account, the third scenario of domination without interference will be worse than that of interference without domination. It will involve a compromise of freedom, whereas the fourth scenario will only involve a conditioning of freedom; formal freedom as nondomination will be present, but it will not be relevantly effective. Under Skinner's version of the republican ideal, however, the scenarios will be of the same value or disvalue. So far as domination and interference are equally the antonyms of freedom, the scenarios will count as equally bad; formal freedom will be absent in each case. This divergence in the ranking of the last two scenarios is the one and only difference between the two accounts.
ARGUING FOR THE PRIORITY OF DOMINATION
Quentin Skinner's knowledge and command of the neo-Roman, republican texts is unequalled, and certainly unequalled by me. But I am still inclined to think that my version of the ideal of freedom to be found in those texts is more satisfactory. The main reason for taking this view is that my account seems to fit better with the clear tendency among neo-Roman writers to rate domination without interference as worse than interference without domination.
The model of interference without domination is the coercion of the will implicit in the imposition of a nonarbitrary rule of law. As already mentioned, I think of a rule of law as nonarbitrary to the extent that those who make the Under the Skinner reading of the republican ideal, on the other hand, we will need to find a special explanation as to why these writers speak in nonHobbesian and non-Benthamite tones-as to why they speak in Roman rather than gothic tones, as he puts it elsewhere33-when they discourse on the relation between law and liberty. He has such an explanation to offer in the case of Machiavelli: that Machiavelli sees the restrictions of the law as preventing people from indulging their appetites and avoiding public service and from thereby undermining the freedom of the state in which their own freedom is included. But it would be better to be able to make do without such a special account, and in any case it is not clear how far that explanation will work with English writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: with writers, as he himself says, for whom the language of rights plays as impor- Pettit imputes to the defenders of "republican" freedom the view that, since it is only arbitrary domination that limits individual liberty, the act of obeying the law to which you have given your consent is "entirely consistent with freedom" (Pettit 1997a, p. 66; cf.
pp. 55, 56n, 104, 271). The writers I am discussing never deal in such paradoxes.35
I agree that the authors in question do not deal in paradoxes of this kind, but it is a mistake to think that I force paradox upon them.
What I say in the passage from which Skinner quotes does not explicitly raise any paradox, and it is clear from the other passages to which he directs us for comparison that they do not imply paradox either. Making a contrast with familiar, authoritarian and dominating systems of law, I say in the original passage: 'There will be systems of law available, at least in principle, which are entirely undominating and entirely consistent with freedom'.36
And the nonparadoxical intent of that remark is clear in many other comments, including one to which he directs us for comparison: 'We know from previous discussions that any system of law, however effective in countering domination, imposes constraints and costs on people and in that way reduces the extent of their undominated choice; it does not compromise freedom, as we put it, but it does condition it'.37
Construing freedom as nondomination does not force us to think, then, that we are made free by the act of obeying a nonarbitrary law or by the act whereby a nonarbitrary law is imposed on us. It may be that that as the anti- What I suggest in the book is that where I am dominated by another agency, I
should be said to be unfree and that where I am restricted but not dominatedas by a conditioning factor such as an unintended obstacle or a nonarbitrary law-then I should be said to be nonfree.39 And so I comment that while the tax levy or even the term of imprisonment might not take away a person's freedom in an ideal world-they might not have the effect of a dominating agency-still they would leave the person nonfree: 'while they do not compromise someone's freedom as non-domination they do allow us to say that the person is not free to spend or to travel as they wish '.40 This content downloaded from 128. that what makes domination bad for freedom is found equally in every case of interference minus domination. The idea is that it would be inconsistent to represent domination as the primary affront to freedom on a ground that pertains just as much to interference of that kind. The feature that makes domination bad, so he suggests, is the restriction of choice that it enforces, and that feature is found equally in nonarbitrary and undominating interference, as it is indeed in the limitations imposed by natural obstacles and the like.
The person who is dominated will tend to second-guess the wishes of the dominator, wanting to keep him or her on side and to restrict their own options accordingly. 42 In the traditional language, they will tend to toady and fawn, bow and scrape, placate and ingratiate-in a word, abase themselves; furthermore, they will censor everything they say and do, tailoring it to an assuaging effect. In short, they will force themselves to do things they wouldn't otherwise have done-make self-abasing moves-and they will have to stop themselves doing things they would have done: that is, adopt self- son who is subject to the arbitrary will of another will never be sure of where they stand or what to expect, and so may find it difficult to make firm plans; after all, any plans they make will be hostage to the will of the master. They will be in a worse position than someone who faces a comparable prospect of natural obstruction, since there is no possibility of spite or whimsy operating there. And of course they will be much worse off than someone who is subject only to nonarbitrary interference that is designed to track their own readily avowable interests.
But apart from being likely to occasion a distinctive sort of uncertainty, domination will also tend to introduce a characteristic asymmetry of status. A relationship of domination leaves the dominated person in a position where it is likely to be a matter of common knowledge that he or she is exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference and cannot, therefore, speak his or her mind without risk of falling out of favour and cannot be ascribed a voice that claims the attention and respect of others. Even if the dominated person thinks it unlikely that as things stand between them the dominator will interfere, this is not something that he or she can signal-say, speaking out forthrightly-short of assuming a defiant or brazen posture and perhaps thereby triggering a manifestation of the arbitrary power of the other. Subjection to undominating interference-to interference that is forced to track their own perceived interests-will not carry any such deprivation of status in its wake. Table 1 .
The really important divide among these theories of political freedom is that between the theory that identifies it with nondomination and that which identifies it with nonrestriction of any kind. The first argues that domination is such a distinctive evil that it alone should count as the formal antonym of freedom and that nondominating forms of restriction, whether they stem from intentional interference or nonintentional limitation, should be cast as a secondary, conditioning evil. The third argues that all forms of restriction are equally bad, at least in the ledger book of liberty, and they should all be cast as evils that compromise freedom.
The second view is positioned in an unstable way between these two. It has to find something evil in common to domination and interference that is lacking in nonintentional limitation. But it is hard to see any evil that can plausibly be invoked to fill this role. The suggestion I see in Skinner's remarks, to the effect that the evil common to domination and interference is restriction of choice, does not provide a satisfactory reason for taking the second view. So far as limitation also restricts choice, the suggestion argues for going over from the second to the third view.5'
CONCLUSION
We began this essay by noting that there is one remaining difference between Quentin Skinner's construal of republican liberty and mine.
Whereas he contrasts freedom with a composite antonym of nondomination and noninterference, I contrast it with the single antonym of nondomination.
We saw that this does not make for an enormous contrast, since I have to 
Freedom is compromised by Yes Yes Yes
Freedom is conditioned by first as worse than the second and to be reasonably well disposed towards the second. I argued that the expectations raised by my construal seem to fit better with republican thought and that it is historically more accurate to identify republican freedom with nondomination. But I also went on to make three other, more conceptual points in its defence. domination has other effects besides restricting choice that make it inimical to freedom. And third, I pointed out that if the fact of restricting choice is enough to make something into the antonym of freedom, then freedom should be thought to require not just nondomination and noninterference but also nonlimitation. Any theory that goes beyond identifying freedom with nondomination will have to identify it with nonlimitation of any kind; it cannot find a stable resting point in the identification of freedom with a joint ideal of nondomination and noninterference.52 NOTES
